Peter Edel, 15 July 2010

Each time just after an act of terrorism in Turkey there is this strange obscure vacuum. When the assault is claimed and even when suspects have been detained there will always be questions about the facts.

It’s far from illogical to bring up questions like, “Who really did it?” An analytical view of modern history shows that terrorism is often not what it appears to be at first. An act of terrorism may very well be instigated by provocateurs who have infiltrated groups. Or it may be a “false flag” operation, meaning terrorism committed in ways that make it appear as though it was done by others. With such strategies entering the arena, the edges between various forms of extremism can become very blurred. And they become even more blurred with the phenomenon that extremists on whatever side usually have more in common with each other than with the moderates in society. This effect can lead to the most paradoxical alliances and is often the reason why nothing is really what it seems at first with terrorism.

There is a distinctive psychological side to terrorism. While traditional warfare is about gaining territory, the terrorist wants to conquer public opinion instead. Whether based on religious or political ideologies, terrorists always go for public opinion one way or another. The intention to create political chaos through violence is another common denominator between them. These common grounds can to a certain extent lead to contacts and sometimes even to cooperation and joint operations by groups which oppose each other entirely in the “normal world.” A similarity in strategies applied by various terrorist groups is usually the basis for connections of this kind. Let’s illustrate this with the strategies of radical left and extreme right terrorist groups in Italy during the ’70s. Of course, we see opposing schemes. Violence from the left follows the expectation that political chaos will unmask the state, followed by a sequence of unchained revolutionary events. In the approach of right-wing terrorism, political chaos and instability will make the public demand drastic measures, with success for right-wing parties during elections, or a military takeover as an imagined result. Major differences. The point is that as long the state of political chaos has not been reached, the strategies are almost identical, which is the lubricant for infiltration and black flag operations. This combination is able to cover any terrorist attack in a shroud of uncertainty. That’s what happened in Italy during the ’70s. And that’s what seems to be taking place in Turkey nowadays.

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Tags: Ergenekon, Gladio, Strategy of Tension

This entry was posted on Tuesday, August 10th, 2010 at 3:21 pm and is filed under False Flag. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.